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One of the contributions of feminist theory to contemporary intellectual thought is its reflections on the body and embodiment. While in the dominant Western philosophical tradition the body is either dismissed or absent - with some exceptions such as the philosophy of Nietzsche, Husserl and the French existential phenomenologists - feminism has given attention to the body.​[1]​ Feminists not only take the body as a subject of investigation, for instance by studying eating disorders and cosmetic surgery, but they also question the association of mind and body with masculinity and femininity, and explicitly criticize the dominant intellectual tradition for ignoring the body, or for considering it in a one-sided manner.​[2]​ 
Gadamer and Ricoeur are not among the continental thinkers in contemporary history, such as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Derrida, and also Husserl and Heidegger, who are much reflected upon within feminist philosophy.​[3]​ In this article we shall ask whether or not this is a missed opportunity for feminist thought. We will start by sketching Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s views of the body. These thinkers do not focus at length on the theme of the body and their reflections are mostly only fragmentary. Therefore, in the first part of the article, we will attempt to gather together these fragments. This part ends with a comparison of both views. In the second part, we will identify the elements in their thought that may contribute to feminist theory, but we will also note the limitations of their view of the body for feminism. 

[A] Gadamer’s view of the body as constituting our being-in-the-world 
Gadamer wrote a number of articles in which he develops notions concerning the body. The theoretical context for his analyses is the problem of the hermeneutics of the body, that is, understanding the body. These articles appeared from the 1960’s through 1991 and were collected, translated into English and published in the book The Enigma of Health. The Art of Healing in a Scientific Age. As the title makes clear, the example which Gadamer uses of the problem of understanding the body is the relationship in which the physician attempts to understand the bodily state of his or her patient. 
Within a broader philosophical context, Gadamer developed his view of the body within the phenomenological tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Gadamer notes, however, that neither Husserl nor Heidegger developed an extensive or adequate theory of the body. Gadamer writes: 

Husserl’s analyses concerning the kinesthetic constitution of our bodily being are of exquisite subtlety. However does not the real mystery of our body consist in this, that the actual being of the body is not an object of consciousness? (Vessey 2000, p. 73)

With reference to Heidegger, Gadamer notes that even though Heidegger takes his point of departure in being-in-the-world, he was forced to admit to not having developed an analysis of the body. (Gadamer 1996, p. 70). As Heidegger states in Being and Time, ‘This ‘bodily nature’ hides a whole problematic of its own, although we shall not treat it here’ (Heidegger 2002, p. 143). Despite these shortcomings in the treatment of the body in the work of Husserl and Heidegger, their respective notions of the life world and the thrownness of our being-in-the-world are very useful for Gadamer as points of departure for thinking about the body.​[4]​
Gadamer argues that the human being, as bodily, finds itself taken up in larger meaning structures. Human existence takes place within historical, cultural, and linguistic contexts. These are not purely mental or ethereal but are linked to very concrete factors which constitute our world. Gadamer speaks of the role of climate -- that is, of weather, the seasons, and temperature -- and of the environment -- that is, of the need for water and general sustenance. He mentions the movement of the stars, the rise and fall of the oceans and the living nature of the woods and fields (Gadamer 1996, p. 115). All these elements make up the context of our lives. Gadamer describes this as a whole which includes and involves the entire life situation of a person and others (Gadamer 1996, p. 41). This whole is the unity of being itself in which we live. To illustrate his view, he cites Socrates: 

Socrates…asks: ‘Do you believe that one can understand the nature of the soul without understanding the nature of the whole?’ And his friend replies: ‘If we may believe Hippocrates the Asclepiad, then one cannot even understand anything of the body without this procedure.’ (Gadamer 1996, p. 40) 

Neither body nor soul functions in isolation from the totality of being.
Gadamer notes that being healthy is the capacity to function within the whole. Health is thus not simply ascertained by introspection or by focusing on the individual. Speaking of human health, he states: ‘Rather, it is a condition of being involved, of being in the world, of being together with one’s fellow human beings, of active and rewarding engagement in one’s everyday tasks’ (Gadamer 1996, p. 113). Human beings are involved in their world and engage with other people. That bodily health is fundamental for this being-in-the world is shown by the fact that when people become ill they withdraw from the world and others. Their world becomes more confined (Gadamer 1996, p. 42).  
Our being-in-the-world means that we not only live in a greater whole, but that we live in harmony with it. This harmony is found in our own bodily existence. Gadamer goes so far as to define bodily existence in terms of harmony. He states: 

The life of the body always seems to me to be something which is experienced as a constant movement between the loss of equilibrium and the search for a new point of stability…This seems to me to be the fundamental model for our bodily, and not merely bodily, existence as human beings. (Gadamer 1996, p. 78)  

Harmony is thus constitutive of our bodily being. Health as harmony is an ancient Greek notion which Gadamer takes up again. Health is according to Gadamer ‘…the rhythm of life, a permanent process in which equilibrium reestablishes itself’ (Gadamer 1996, p. 114). He speaks of the processes of breathing, digesting and sleeping: ‘The cycle of these three rhythmic phenomena helps to produce vitality, refreshment and the restoration of energy’ (Gadamer 1996, p. 114). Gadamer notes that it is important to balance sleep and wakefulness (Gadamer 1996, p. 85-86).  He speaks of mental health as a balance which can be disturbed by mental illness and of health as a balance of the body which is lost when one is ill (Gadamer 1996, p. 59-60).
The notion that the body can only be understood in light of the whole – whether it is the whole of being, of nature, of our social environment or of our lives – means that the understanding of the body is a form of hermeneutical understanding. As Gadamer explains in Truth and Method, hermeneutics as the art of understanding always involves a consideration of contexts, of the whole in which that which is to be interpreted is found. Hermeneutics of the text is the art of reading individual sentences in the context of paragraphs, paragraphs in the light of chapters, chapters in light of the whole book, the book in the context of the works of the author, the writings of the author in terms of cultural climate and historical contexts. Ultimately, the horizons of understanding expand into the dimensions of language and being. So too understanding our body is always contextual understanding. 
 
[B] The physician’s art of understanding the body
In his book The Enigma of Health, Gadamer discusses the problem of understanding the body through an analysis of how a physician understands the body. Two elements of this understanding are central to Gadamer’s analysis – the hermeneutical notions of understanding through dialogue and that of understanding the particular in light of the universal.
First, Gadamer sees communication as central for the understanding of the bodily state of the patient. This communication is dialogical. Gadamer notes that not all dialogue between physician and patient is ideally open. Doctors in their practice may operate under the stress of time.  In hospitals they may be forced to treat patients as numbers (Gadamer 1996, p. 127). In addition, the relationship between doctors and patients is not always an ideal one for dialogue. The patient can feel uncertain, needy or afraid, while the doctor can have an aura of authority which impedes the conversation (Gadamer 1996, p. 127). Yet Gadamer notes that dialogue, a central notion in his hermeneutics, also applies to the doctor-patient relationship. This dialogue is one in which openness, respect, appropriate distance and mutual understanding must play a role (Gadamer 1996, p. 128). He further states that even though the relationship between a doctor and patient can have elements of tension, it is necessary to have the dialogue take the form of a normal conversation as much as possible. The purpose is to have a meaningful dialogue in which true communications occurs. He describes the purpose of the dialogue in these terms: ‘Genuine dialogue, rather, is concerned with creating the opportunity for the other to awaken his or her own inner activity – what doctors call the patient’s own “participation”- without losing their way once again.’ (Gadamer 1996, p. 137). The patient must be able to express himself or herself in the conversation. The goal of such a conversation, which Gadamer calls the miracle of language, is finding ‘…exactly the right word or…the perfect expression in the words of someone else’ (Gadamer 1996, p. 137-138). Gadamer states that such a true conversation is possible because of attentiveness. This attentiveness is the capacity to ‘…sense the demands of an individual person at a particular moment and to respond to those demands in an appropriate manner. It is in these terms that we must understand what is involved in therapeutic dialogue’ (Gadamer 1996, p. 138). 
Secondly, the physician can never simply apply the results of scientific research to the body in a universal, abstract way. It is the task of the physician to explore the individual aspects of illness and by means of the aforementioned dialogue to discover the contexts and specificities of his illness. Only then can a proper diagnosis be developed and a therapy be prescribed. The task of the physician is one of applying the universal principles of science to the particular situation of the patient (Gadamer 1996, p. 39-40). As such, the role of the physician is more the application of art than it is the application of science (Gadamer 1996, p. 31-44). What Gadamer means by this art of understanding can be illustrated by the example of the physician making a particular diagnosis. Science tells the physician what the general symptoms of a disease are. This science of health is the science of general principles. But the physician is confronted by concrete symptoms. A symptom can be a symptom of many illnesses. The physician must make a great number of artful decisions. Is the symptom to be taken as a sign of a serious illness? Is further testing required? Does the patient have a history of such symptoms? Does this history explain the symptoms which have arisen? Are there factors in the personal situation of the patient which could account for the symptoms – medications used, lifestyle, diet, stress? The physician continuously makes such calls, and a good physician is a good diagnostician. Interestingly, Gadamer describes this process of coming to a diagnosis as not only intellectual and verbal but also as manual: part of the process is that of the physician manually examining the individual patient (Gadamer 1996, p. 99). Gadamer speaks of the integration of science and practical reason as a situation ‘…in which diagnosis, treatment, dialogue and the participation of the patient all come together’ (Gadamer 1996, p. 138). 
The art of the physician is the art of understanding the body in a hermeneutical sense (Gadamer 1996, p. 104).  In Truth and Method, Gadamer describes hermeneutical application as the art of applying general principles to particular situations. For example, in the case of legal hermeneutics, it is the task of the judge to apply laws which are universally applicable to individual situations. A law forbidding theft and prescribing penalties for this offence is applied by the judge to a particular situation – in light of the specific instance of theft and in consideration of the individual criminal history of the thief. Application of universal principles to particular situations also plays a role in theological hermeneutics.
If we can speak of a hermeneutical view of the body in the Gadamerian sense, it is a view of the understanding and interpretation of the body in the light of the wider contexts in which the particular person lives and in light of the application of dialogue as well as of universal principles to the observation of the particular situation of the person.  

[B] A non-objectifying understanding of the body
Gadamer contrasts his own view of the body to views which are less holistic than his. He criticizes the distinction between body and soul as well as an instrumentalistic view of the body.
Gadamer agrees with the Aristotelian notion that the soul is the entelechy of the body. This means that there is a fundamental unity between body and soul – the one cannot function without the other. In keeping with Aristotle, he regards the soul as that which gives life to the body – noting that the German words Leben (life) and Leib (body) should be linked to each other (Gadamer 1996, p. 142-143). The soul animates the body; it is the principle of self-movement.  According to Gadamer, Descartes, in making a distinction between mind and body, sees the mind as pure self-consciousness and the body as objectified and as mechanical (Gadamer 1996, p. 148). In Gadamer’s view, life is more than mere mechanism – it is something which is experienced. Gadamer sees the  living being as a unified organism, not just a collection of mechanical parts (Gadamer 1996, p. 149).
Gadamer also argues that the body must not be seen in an instrumentalistic way. Modern science makes the body into an object which can be investigated by objectifying it. This does not do justice to the particularity of the body as the lived experience of a human being in the world. We can be studied as a Körper, as a bodily object, but we exist as Leib, as a living, bodily subject (Gadamer 1998, p. 134).  Our objectified body can be measured in the external sense of the term measurement. But Gadamer states that this is only one meaning of the notion of measurement. The other meaning of the term measurement is that which is fitting. This measurement is from within (Gadamer 1996, p. 132-134). The nature and experience of the living body cannot be captured by objectifying means. As living bodies, we are all unique – living in our own bodies in particular ‘fitting’ situations in the world. 
This view of the body as lived experience as opposed to being a mechanical object or an object of science means that the understanding of the body must be an understanding of the person as a living embodied subject. Returning to the theme of the understanding of the body by the physician, this means that the physician must see the person with whom he is speaking as an embodied subject – someone who lives subjectively in his body, who acts from out of his body, who stands in interaction with the world in a bodily sense, in short, a person who is his body. 

[B] The enigmatic nature of the understanding of the body
Gadamer describes health as enigmatic and the understanding of the body as limited. This is so for a number of reasons. Health can be called enigmatic because we cannot really grasp what it is to be healthy. We can only say that we have the experience that we are functioning in such a way that we would describe ourselves as being healthy. Gadamer asks whether being healthy is even a state which we are in. He notes that well-being seems hidden from us, that we are not consciously aware of it, and that it seems to be only a condition in which nothing hurts (Gadamer 1996, p. 130). We do not even reflect on our being healthy until we feel sick. Health is not something which can be defined. 
	The experience of health is furthermore not the same for all people. For example, a person with a chronic disease will describe himself as healthy in a very different way from someone who does not suffer from such an ailment. Gadamer notes that it is the task of the patient to make clear to the doctor what is wrong, to indicate in what sense the patient feels unhealthy or ill (Gadamer 1996, p. 138).
	Another sense in which knowledge of the body is enigmatic is that it is not always clear what type of pain we are feeling and where the pain is. Gadamer speaks of the self-concealment of pain (Gadamer 1996, p. 131). It is, for example, very difficult to point to the exact tooth which hurts or to know where exactly we are feeling pain in the chest. Sometimes pain can even be imaginary as in the case of hurting phantom limbs.
	Lastly, the whole art of the physician to heal has an enigmatic aspect. This is due to the fact that the physician does not really heal the patient; it is, Gadamer notes, nature which does the healing. In this sense, the relationship between patient and doctor is one that has an element in it which cannot be understood or controlled. The fact that nature heals us shows us the limits of our power over the body (Gadamer 1996, p. 32-36).

[A] Ricoeur’s perception of the body as ‘I can’ and passivity
In Paul Ricoeur’s oeuvre the theme of the body is not systematically developed. But that does not imply that it is absent from his works. For Ricoeur, we are beings who come into the world ‘in the mode of incarnation’ (Ricoeur 1992, p. 55). ‘Incarnation,’ a concept that he derives from his teacher, Gabriel Marcel, represents the ontological unity of a human’s being-in-the-world. 
The notion of incarnation is already central in Ricoeur’s doctoral dissertation, Freedom and Nature (1950, 2007a). In this phenomenological study on the reciprocal relationship between the voluntary and the involuntary, Ricoeur’s view of the body is worked out in the most extensive manner of his entire oeuvre. About ten years later in a short essay, ‘Wonder, Eroticism, and Enigma’ (1964), Ricoeur reflects upon sexuality and the difference between eroticism and tenderness. The notion of sexuality in this essay also gives us an idea of his view on embodiment. He considers sexuality as an enigma and as irreducible to language. Thirty years later, in his synthesizing and summarizing study of the self, Oneself as Another (1992), the body reappears as the ontological status of the being that we are. Here Ricoeur, albeit very briefly, works out his ideas on the body that he developed in Freedom and Nature, and considers the body as both activity and passivity, and as flesh as well as body among other bodies. The notions of the body that Ricoeur develops in these works will be outlined and related to each other in the following section.​[5]​

[B] The body as the involuntary	
In Freedom and Nature, the first volume of Ricoeur’s philosophy of the will, the human body is introduced as the involuntary. ‘Man’s body and the host of problems connected with it enters on the scene together with the involuntary,’ Ricoeur claims (2007a, p. 8). The involuntary has no meaning of its own. What is more, understanding proceeds from the voluntary and not from the involuntary. The involuntary gives motives and capacities, foundations and limits to the will, but can only be understood from the ordering principle of the will.
Ricoeur distinguishes between different types of involuntary structures that are related to the three moments of the will he analyses, namely the moments of decision, motion, and consent. Decision is based on motives. Voluntary motion implies preformed skills, emotions and habit. To the ‘data’ in the category of the absolutely involuntary - which takes the form of character, the unconscious and biological – the individual consents.
In the case of motives that underlie decisions, Ricoeur discusses bodily needs and pleasures. Needs and pleasures do not in themselves explain why we decide to do something, but need to be appropriated by a will. As such, they are the involuntary underlying the voluntary. Nevertheless, the will also has a freedom with respect to these motives, and in that sense forms its own reason to make a choice. 
Movement is perceived by Ricoeur as ‘the organ of  Cogito’s practical incarnation’ (Kohak in Ricoeur 2007a, p.  xxiv). In movement, the person appears as the unity of the voluntary and involuntary. This is here more so than in the case of decision, which - as idea - seems distinct from action. Ricoeur carefully describes the spontaneity and availability of the involuntary in action as presented in preformed skills, emotion and habit. In all of these analyses, he shows that they include voluntary acts. For instance, preformed skills, such as standing up and bending are not simply involuntary, since whether I stand up or bend is a voluntary act. Something similar goes for emotions: they seem to be involuntary motives for my actions, but they include elements of valuation and judgment. As such, preformed skills, emotions and habit form the ‘organs’ of the voluntary and do not master or control it.
The will, however, not only encounters a relative involuntary in the sense just described, it also meets the absolutely involuntary of character type, the unconscious, and sheer biological life, birth and death. Can these given involuntary elements also be understood in terms of the will? Ricoeur here speaks of the will as consenting to the particulars that form my situation. Consent for him is ‘the ultimate reconciliation of freedom and nature’ (Ricoeur 2007a, p. 346), in that it pertains to actively accepting my situation as mine, instead of passively acknowledging it as necessity. In the end, that implies not a surrender to but a refusal of one’s condition. Consent is won only from a refusal to be submerged in nature.
In Freedom and Nature the body and the fact that we are embodied form the necessary underside of our existence. The body gives us the possibility of acting. It cannot be submitted to the human will and is not reducible to the will. As the involuntary it stands in a dialectical relationship to the voluntary. 
In the ‘General Introduction’ to the book Ricoeur writes that the task of describing the voluntary and involuntary is ‘one of becoming receptive to Cogito’s complete experience’ (2007a, p. 8). He relates the body-will relationship to the Cartesian distinction between body and mind. In contrast to Descartes’ separation of body and mind in the Meditations, Ricoeur takes his point of departure from the union between soul and body that Descartes describes in his letters to Princess Elizabeth. For Ricoeur the Cogito is embodied, and we can only discover the body and the involuntary which it sustains in the context of the embodied Cogito. ‘The Cogito’s experience, taken as a whole, includes “I desire”, “I can”, “I intend” and, in a general way, my existence as a body’ (Ricoeur 2007a, p. 9). Ricoeur in this respect also speaks of the ‘Cogito in the first person.’
His notion of the body as the involuntary that stands in a dialectical relationship to the voluntary implies that the way in which experimental sciences understand the body, namely as empirical object, is a reduction of it. Ricoeur explains that involuntary elements such as need and habit cannot be understood in separation from the subject that experiences, intends, and refers to itself as an ‘I’. Need is always ‘I have need of…,’ habit is ‘I have the habit of….’  Ricoeur thus objects to perceiving the involuntary as simply an empirical fact and the body as an object. Rather it is a ‘subject body’ that is the source of motives, forms a cluster of capacities, and is nature.
Apart from refusing to understand the body solely as object, Ricoeur explains that the opposition between object body and subject body does not coincide with the opposition between two perspectives: towards other bodies outside of me and towards myself. Rather, both are different attitudes within two different frames of mind. Ricoeur considers the subject as both myself and yourself. The same can be said of the body: ‘a personal body (corps propre) is someone’s body, a subject’s body, my body, and your body’ (Ricoeur 2007a, p. 10). Consequently, Ricoeur not only comprehends the body as object and subject, but also understanding the body as subject is not limited to one’s own body, but includes understanding the other’s body. The body’s subjectivity implies that I understand myself as embodied, and understand other human beings as embodied. In communicating with another, I do not reduce the other’s body to an empirical object, but I read his or her body as ‘indicating acts which have a subjective aim and origin.’ ‘The you is another myself’ (2007a, p. 11), writes Ricoeur, anticipating his book Oneself as Another that he wrote 40 years later.
In short, Ricoeur in Freedom and Nature aims at what he, in line with Gabriel Marcel, calls the active participation in ‘my incarnation as a mystery’ (2007a, p. 14). ‘Mystery’ in this respect refers to what Ricoeur calls ‘the nourishing and inspiring spontaneity’ of embodied existence. He opposes it to the self-positing consciousness and to a self that in a ‘sterile circle’ constantly returns to itself.  Ricoeur’s perspective on the body in this early work is an existential phenomenological one. Distancing his perspective from the way in which the sciences understand the body and from the way in which Husserl does, he writes that the body is ‘neither constituted in an objective sense, nor constitutive as a transcendental subject – it eludes this pair of opposites. It is the existing I’ (Ricoeur 2007a, p. 16).

[B] Sexuality as Enigma
In the intriguing short essay, ‘Wonder, Eroticism, and Enigma,’ a similar notion of embodiment can be found. Even though Ricoeur does not speak of the body in this essay, but rather of sexuality, the essay is illustrative of his notion of the body. 
	Ricoeur describes sexuality as ‘impermeable to reflection and inaccessible to human mastery,’ and relates it to the mythical. Sexuality gives us the vivid and obscure feeling that we engage in the uniqueness and universality of life. It makes us experience that we engage in ‘the river of life’ (Ricoeur 1994, p. 83). Stronger than embodiment, sexuality makes us feel that we take part in life and that it escapes us what precisely that is.  
Ricoeur envisions sexuality as a human being’s ‘other side,’ as that which is irreducible to language, tools (techniques), and institutions (such as marriage), all of which form ‘the trilogy which composes man’ (ibid.). Sexuality does not belong to these central components that characterize humanity as such, but belongs to humanity’s prelinguistic existence. When expressed in language, sexuality remains ‘an infra-, para, or superlinguistic expression. It mobilizes language, true, but crosses it, jostles it, sublimates it, stupefies it, pulverizes it into a murmur, an invocation.’ (ibid.)
	Ricoeur refers to sexuality not only as that which cannot be completely articulated, which escapes linguistic articulation, but he more fundamentally perceives it as enigma. Sexuality partakes in a universe that is sunken within us, a ‘dislocated universe.’ It is accessible by hermeneutics, by exegesis of ancient myths for instance, but its organic side escapes from hermeneutics. Sexuality is enigmatic because it is irreducible to language, techniques and institutions. This enigmatic element can be symbolically represented but not absorbed in an ethic or technique. 
Ricoeur’s account of sexuality further explains his perception of embodiment as enigmatic. Embodiment can be articulated, but not completely, for Ricoeur names it a mystery that escapes language. As such, it reveals the limits of hermeneutics. 

[B] The flesh as intimacy to the self and as opening onto the world 
In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur’s notion of the body has characteristics similar to those in Freedom and Nature. But instead of speaking in terms of the voluntary and involuntary, freedom and nature, Ricoeur in this later work speaks of activity and passivity. The body appears at once as I can (1992, pp. 111-2, 323) but also as the fundamental passivity that opens the self ontologically to otherness. The enigmatic character of embodiment mentioned in Freedom and Nature and in the essay on sexuality does not return in Oneself as Another. Nevertheless, in the latter Ricoeur still considers human beings as incarnated, and his perspective on embodiment remains an existential phenomenological one. He further works out the themes of Freedom and Nature in the sense that he develops a notion of the self that forms an alternative to the Cartesian Cogito, namely, a self that is embodied, is part of the world and engages with others. The body in this respect is important as the intermediate between self and world and as an encounter with otherness.   
	Ricoeur starts the development of his notion of the self in Oneself as Another with the philosophy of language. The first mention of the body appears in this context, but is not sufficient for Ricoeur. Instead of understanding the body from the limited perspective of the philosophy of language, he suggests that this understanding must be anchored within the phenomenological tradition in which mental and physical predicates are attributed to the twofold structure of the lived body: as observable reality and as ‘what is mine’ (1992, p. 54). That implies that one’s own body adheres to two domains at once: the domain of things and the domain of the self. 
	In the ensuing chapters on human action, Ricoeur claims that it is only on the basis of belonging to the world as an embodied self that we can perceive human action as an event in the world and as having an author that is able to refer to him- or herself as agent. ‘One’s own body is the very place (…) of this belonging, thanks to which the self can place its mark on those events that are its actions’ (1992, p. 319). 
	Next, Ricoeur turns to the question of personal identity. Personal identity ties the corporeal and mental criteria of identity to the constancy of a self that finds its anchor in its own body. In this context, Ricoeur objects to identifications of the self with the psyche or mind and the body with the constancy of the self. He claims that he does not want to enter into discussions, like those in the analytical tradition, over the best criterion for identity: psychological or corporeal (1992, p. 128).​[6]​ Also, the body does not form the permanent part of our being, it does not remain ‘the same’: ‘One only has to compare two self-portraits of Rembrandt’, he writes (1992, p. 129).
	Ricoeur considers human beings not only as active, but also as undergoing, as suffering from the actions of others. The body in this respect appears not as the capacity for action, but as passivity. For instance, in the case of physical pain, the body forms a passivity. It prevents me from performing the actions that I would like to undertake, and can make me experience that my self does not coincide with my body, in the sense that I want something else than my body allows me to do. As such, in Ricoeur’s own words, the body ‘overlaps with the passivity belonging to the category of other people’ (1992, p. 320). As that which can make the self suffer, the body stands phenomenologically on one level with other persons who make me suffer - albeit that for Ricoeur the lack of self esteem and hatred of others that can result from suffering caused by another person exceeds physical pain (ibid.). 
	The notion of the body as passivity is developed more extensively in the last chapter of Oneself as Another, in which the body forms one of the three ways in which the self encounters otherness on an ontological level. Ricoeur distinguishes – as a working hypothesis, he adds – a triad of passivities, of phenomenological experiences of otherness, which relate to three ontological faces of otherness that are constitutive for the self. The triad consists of, first, ‘the passivity represented by the experience of one’s own body - or (…) the flesh’, secondly, ‘the passivity implied by the relation of the self to the foreign’, that is the other (than) self, and thirdly, ‘the most deeply hidden passivity, that of the relation of the self to itself, which is conscience’ (1992, p. 318). 
	In specifying the otherness of the body, Ricoeur takes his point of departure within the phenomenological tradition of thinkers such as Maine de Biran, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty and Henry. He does not elaborate on their perspectives on the body, and does not consider the differences between these philosophers, but only mentions a few central points of this tradition to clarify his perspective on the body. He starts with Maine de Biran who, writes Ricoeur, was the first philosopher to introduce one’s own body ‘into the region of nonrepresentative certainty’ (1992, p. 321). In other words, we have an assurance of our own body, but this certainty of our body is not symbolical and does not take the form of mental knowledge. Ricoeur relates it to ‘passivity,’ and he claims that Maine de Biran describes different degrees of passivity. Embodiment entails activity: ‘“I am” is to say “I want, I move, I do”,’ but also implies resistance that gives way to effort.  Both form an indivisible unity. Furthermore, embodiment gives way to capricious humors, impressions of being content or discontent, and it encounters the resistance of external things. It gives the greatest certainty of one’s own existence, but gives the greatest certainty of external existence as well. The body, in short, mediates between the intimacy of the self and the externality of the world (Ricoeur 1992, p. 322).
	Husserl’s distinction between Leib and Körper, flesh and body,​[7]​ as developed in his Cartesian Meditations, forms another major point of reference for Ricoeur’s conception of the body. What Ricoeur finds inescapably developed in Husserl is an ontology of the flesh. Yet, Husserl is limited because of his emphasis on intention as the constitution of all reality in and through consciousness. He does not escape the philosophies of the cogito that Ricoeur aims to evade. Ricoeur thinks that Heidegger’s Being and Time offers a more suitable framework, for it offers a break with our constitution on the basis of the intentionality of consciousness. Ricoeur states that Heidegger’s ‘thrownness’ comes closer than Husserl’s idealistic notion of the body to the primary otherness that he aims at articulating (Ricoeur 1992, p. 322, 326-327). But Heidegger ‘did not allow an ontology of the flesh to unfold’ (1992, p. 322). 
	Ricoeur takes his point of departure here in the Fifth of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, where Husserl addresses the question of the constitution of a shared nature, of an intersubjectively founded nature. Husserl especially concentrates upon the creation of the distinction between flesh and body in this process. He suggests that the transcendental ego constitutes other egos as equal partners in an intersubjective community, which founds the ‘objective,’ i.e., intersubjective world. The constitution of the other as alter ego for Husserl necessitates the methodological step of reduction to ownness (Reduktion auf die Eigenheitssphäre), in which all things in my experience are emptied of references to foreign subjectivities, i.e., to other selves. Husserl explains the reduction to ownness as an abstraction both from everything that gives humans and animals their specific sense as living beings with a sense of self, and from the environment as being there for anyone. What remains in this reduction, he says, is a sense of an ‘animated organism as uniquely singled out’ (Leib). My body is the sole object in this abstraction that I do not perceive as just body but as animate organism.  It is something to which I ascribe ‘fields of sensation.’ It is the only object ‘in’ which I ‘rule and govern’ immediately (Husserl 1995, p. 99).​[8]​ By means of this body I perceive; it founds my capacities and my ‘world.’ 
	 In interpreting this passage, Ricoeur shows that Husserl accomplishes the conceptualization of an ontological notion of flesh. What Husserl’s intersubjective constitution of nature obliges us to think is ourselves as flesh before the constitution of the alter ego (Ricoeur 1992, p. 323). In explaining the otherness of the flesh, Ricoeur goes back to Freedom and Nature in which he understood the body as an organ of desire and a support of free movement that is not the object of choice or desire. He claims that it is this notion of the flesh that forms a ‘paradigm of otherness.’ In other words, he further develops the undifferentiated notion of the body in Freedom and Nature, and speaks of ‘flesh’ as that which precedes the distinction between the voluntary and involuntary. It is the ‘I can’ that precedes the ‘I want,’ he claims in Oneself as Another. ‘[The flesh] is the origin of all “alteration of ownness.”’ (Ricoeur 1992, p. 324).  
	While developing an ontological notion of the flesh that is primordial and that makes the world accessible to us, Husserl has difficulties thinking the body as part of the world, as objective Körper. For Ricoeur this aspect of embodiment is important too. It is the observable reality of my body, of its being a thing that appears in the world among other things, body among bodies. Husserl helps us to understand that my body is flesh and that the bodies of others are Körper, but he has no answer to the question: ‘How am I to understand that my flesh is also a body?’ (Ricoeur 1992, p. 326, emphasis added). Here phenomenology finds its limit. Husserl’s ‘solution’ to this problem is to make the flesh part of the world (mondaneiser), that is, to identify oneself with one of the things of nature, a physical body. Ricoeur claims, however, that the body can only function as such when it is flesh and body, and is perceived in this way both by me and the other:

For my flesh appears as a body among bodies only to the extent that I am myself an other among all others, in the apprehension of a common nature, woven, as Husserl says, out of the network of intersubjectivity – itself, unlike Husserl’s conception, founding selfhood in its own way. (Ricoeur 1992, p. 326)

Ricoeur thus claims that the body’s being one among others should be considered as no less primordial than its being flesh. The flesh should be thought of as both intimacy to the self and as opening onto the world. Here again Ricoeur refers to Heidegger, who with the notion of thrownness develops an existential category that Ricoeur calls ‘especially appropriate to an investigation of the self as flesh’ (1992, p. 327). In Ricoeur’s interpretation this notion encompasses the strangeness of human finiteness, sealed by embodiment that can be called primary otherness (ibid.).
	Ricoeur associates being a body among other bodies with ‘opening onto a world,’ ‘finding oneself in the world,’ and ‘appearing in the world’ (1992, p. 326-328).  The body’s being one among many makes apparent that I am part of the world, part of a community, and that others are similar to me -- bodies that are flesh. Ricoeur in this way connects the body’s being flesh with its being a body among other bodies, and the body as a foundation for the acting self with its being the first encounter with otherness. 

[B] A Narrative of the Body
Ricoeur’s phenomenological notion of the body entails that we understand ourselves and others as incarnated beings. The body constitutes our being-in-the-world, which for him implies an opening onto a world and mineness; passive reality and the possibility of action. These facets of his conception of the body underlie all of his works. In Freedom and Nature it is developed as the involuntary that in dialogue with the voluntary explains our decisions, movements and the way we relate to what is fundamentally given: life, birth, death, the unconscious and our character. In the essay on sexuality it gives way to the enigmatic character of desire. And in Oneself as Another, the notion of the body is worked out as ‘I can’ and the first passivity we phenomenologically encounter on an ontological level. For Ricoeur, embodiment thus includes the unity of human existence. Dichotomies such as subject and object, self and other, mind and body, are secondary to the ontological ‘oneness’ that embodied existence implies. 
	Ricoeur’s notion of the body as the unity of individual human existence underlies his notion of the self. This is the case not in the sense that it forms an unvarying basis for the self. The body for Ricoeur is not something ‘the same’ that lies beneath the changing self. Rather, the self is embodied. The body is not foreign to selfhood, because the self can claim: ‘this is my body.’ Given the physical changes in the body over time, the mineness of the body even forms ‘the most overwhelming testimony in favor of the irreducibility of selfhood to sameness’ (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 128). The selfhood of the body is constituted by its belonging to someone who is capable of designating herself as the one whose body this is. The body thus co-constitutes ‘who’ someone is, instead of only signifying someone’s whatness. The whatness and whoness of the body show that it belongs to the order of things as well as to the order of the self. 
	For Ricoeur, both aspects of embodiment are narratable, and thus can be part of narrative identity. In Oneself as Another he develops a narrative notion of personal identity that is articulated within the context of a specific language and culture. Personal identity is a narrative because human life has a pre-narrative capacity; it is prefigured narratively. We understand action and passion through the entire network of expressions and concepts that are offered us in language. Human action is embedded within a semantics of action that makes it understandable. Furthermore, human action is symbolically mediated; it is articulated in ‘signs, rules, norms’ (Ricoeur 1991, p. 28). Ricoeur summarizes the narrative quality of life as follows: 

Our life, when then embraced in a single glance, appears to us as the field of a constructive activity, borrowed from narrative understanding, by which we attempt to discover and not simply to impose from outside the narrative identity that constitutes us. (Ricoeur 1991, p. 32)

We need to narrate who we are in order to understand ourselves, and we can only do so in a specific language and culture. Because we are embodied beings, narratives about the body are part of the narratives of our lives, and are culturally mediated as well. We can recall bodily experiences, explain what we feel and how it feels; we can objectify our body, speak about its characteristics, and about what it shares with others. What can be expressed and articulated about the body thus forms a component of narrative identity. The self that tells its life story incorporates its body into its life story. But the self cannot express its body entirely. Embodiment also includes an enigma; even as it is expressed in language, it also escapes language.

[A] Gadamer and Ricoeur in Dialogue: Understanding the Body 
Although Gadamer and Ricoeur work out different perspectives on the body, they share the perception that the body constitutes our being-in-the-world. We have seen that their notions of the body are strongly indebted to phenomenology, namely to the later Husserl and to Heidegger’s notion of our thrownness into the world. Both Gadamer and Ricoeur take distance from Husserl’s idealism and observe the lack in Heidegger’s work of an elaboration of a concept of the body. From this starting point, the most important aspects of their concept of the body which they have in common can be summarized as follows: the body enables humans to actively participate in the world, and the dichotomy of body and mind is an abstraction from the primordial unity of embodied existence. 
	The indebtedness of Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s views of the body to phenomenology should not veil the fact that they take different positions with respect to the body. Ricoeur remains more in line with the phenomenological tradition, while Gadamer stands more firmly in the hermeneutical tradition. Ricoeur develops a phenomenology in order to understand the nature and experience of the body, while Gadamer focuses on the problem of the hermeneutical understanding of the body.
	Other points of difference between the perceptions on the body of Gadamer and Ricoeur are ones of emphasis. First, their analyses concentrate on different aspects of embodiment. Ricoeur describes the two facets of embodiment, namely its being the basis for our actions and the passivity, or involuntariness, that embodiment implies. He in this sense analyses what it implies to have and be a body. Gadamer, however, sees embodiment mainly as active subjectivity, as a point of departure for engaging with the world. Passivity only plays a role in Gadamer’s analyses in the case of illness, through which active participation in the world is curbed. Secondly, Gadamer analyses embodiment as the state of being in balance. This balance is not limited to the balance of functions in the individual body, but also belongs in a larger context, that is to say of lifestyle, environment, even the context of ‘the whole’ of being. Ricoeur also sees embodiment as occurring in contexts, but his focus is on the question what it means for individual people to be embodied.
	 Part of Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s perception of the body is that they both speak of the limitations to understanding the body. Both believe that there are aspects of bodily existence which are not fully accessible to abstract or theoretical thought. Ricoeur speaks of incarnation as a mystery that is not completely graspable by consciousness, and that restricts the possibilities of consciousness to return to itself. Also, he describes the enigma of sexuality which in turn is an aspect of human embodiment. Sexuality is narratable (in ancient myths) and as such hermeneutically accessible, but it is not fully expressible. Its organic side cannot be expressed. It is in that sense that our own body makes us encounter otherness and that it forms a passivity. Gadamer speaks of the enigma of health. We can only say that we have the experience that we are functioning in such a way that we would describe ourselves as being healthy. We do not even reflect on our being healthy until we feel sick. Health is not something which can be defined and the experience of our bodies can vary widely. Pain and healing in part also take place outside of the realm of objectifying understanding. 
	Even though we cannot speak of identical approaches to the body in Gadamer and Ricoeur, both philosophers contribute to different aspects of the question of how to understand the body. They describe different levels of our understanding of the body. For Ricoeur, the focus is on the idea of understanding of what it implies to be embodied, both as self and also in relationship to the other. The other partly becomes understandable because of having a body that is his or her own, just like my body. Gadamer is concerned with understanding the body on an experiential plane. In both cases, however, the body itself, even though it is symbolically representable, to a certain extent remains an enigma.

[A] Limits for Feminist Theory of the Relevance of Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s View of the Body 
The question we posed at the beginning of this article is whether the ideas of Gadamer and Ricoeur about embodiment and the body can be of use for feminist theory. In this section we will start by delineating the limitations of their views of the body as far as feminism is concerned, only to conclude, in the final section, with a discussion of the remaining relevance of their views for feminism.
	We just saw that Gadamer and Ricoeur have different approaches to understanding the body. Yet for both, cultural influences play an important part. For Gadamer, culture is an ever-present condition for understanding – all understanding is culturally influenced, including the understanding of the body. The same goes for Ricoeur. He considers identity as narrative, and narrative identity as articulated within the context of a specific language and culture. As embodied beings, we create narratives about the body. These narratives are part of the narratives of our lives, and are culturally mediated.
But from a feminist perspective it can be asked whether culture does not have much more of an influence on the way we perceive the body than Gadamer and Ricoeur realize.  In the work of the contemporary feminist thinker Judith Butler, a body notion is developed in which the body is seen as ‘materialized’ in a specific cultural matrix. The body is not signified within a cultural context as a sort of material thing to which we add meaning. ‘Matter’ in Butler’s view implies ‘a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter’ (Butler 1993, p.  9). This implies that the matter of the body is a cultural product as well. In other words, the way we perceive our body (for instance as female or male) is culturally constructed. In confronting Butler’s view on the body with those of Gadamer and Ricoeur, the question arises to what extent embodiment is not only mediated by language and culture as it is in the philosophy of Gadamer and Ricoeur, but more forcefully becomes intelligible through language and culture? 
This problem leads to a second one. Feminists have pointed out that any view of the body must entail a consideration of power structures. Bodies exist as empowered or powerless, and power is continually being exercised over the body in society. Female bodies are especially vulnerable to the exercise of power over them. In her book Women and Human Development, Martha Nussbaum points out that while bodily integrity is of fundamental importance for all people (2000, p. 78), it is not respected in all cultures, especially in the case of women. Forced marriages, laws legislating the frequency of sexual intercourse, and decrees and customs forbidding women to go outside the home are all examples of the imposition of power structures specifically on women’s bodies. The philosophies of Gadamer and Ricoeur do not seem able to give an adequate account of such dynamics.
As a number of feminist critics have observed, one of the major drawbacks of Gadamer’s philosophy for feminism is its lack of awareness of the working of power in processes of understanding (Code 2003, pp. 10-27).  It is, however, notable that in the Enigma of Health Gadamer mentions Foucault. He states that Foucault showed that mental illness and abnormality must be analyzed from a social and political point of view. Gadamer comments: 

It cannot be denied that an awareness of social norms, as well as corresponding forms of behavior on the part of society as a whole, always contribute to the definition of such a concept of illness, and so render it problematic. (Gadamer 1996, p. 169) 

He notes that this applies to the definition of madness and normalcy. But beyond such remarks, Gadamer does not have an elaborate view of the role of power structures in relation to a view of the body. Gadamer’s focus in this book is on threats to the notion of the body in the sphere of the objectification of the body by science. 
Ricoeur also does not seem to take power processes into account in his writings on embodiment. Although, generally speaking, he cannot be accused of ignoring power,​[9]​ he does not consider the uneven distributions of power and privileges that are often related to bodily differences such as gender, race, age and health. He does not explicitly elaborate on the consequences of having a male or female body, a sick or healthy body, a colored or white body, or an old or young one. The specific forms of disrespect and discrimination that are related to bodily differences are not taken into consideration by him, even though it should be noted that on the basis of his reflections upon justice and recognition, these consequences could be worked out.
That brings us to the problem of the politics of the body. Gadamer has explicitly stated that philosophy should not concern itself with political issues (Code 2003, p. 28). This has been a source of concern for feminists interpreting Gadamer. His philosophy does not strive for emancipation in a practical sense. Ricoeur’s philosophy does not take into account the significance of being differently embodied and the power structures this entails in our society. This means he also fails to bring us further along in women’s emancipation.
The next problem that can be noted is the importance of being able to think alterity. Many feminists believe that one of the reasons for the lack of awareness of the female in Western society is the tendency to think of all people as the same, as male, or as having to conform to the same standard, that of maleness. In that respect the work of Luce Irigaray is illustrative. She claims that sexual difference is irreducible. Between man and woman ‘there really is otherness: biological, morphological, relational’ (1996, p. 61).  For her, the ethical endeavor is to respect the other’s otherness, or what she also calls transcendence. This interest in thinking alterity also applies to the body – the capacity of thinking and respecting the difference between male and female bodies and bodily experience. 
To what extent can the philosophies of Gadamer and Ricoeur truly deal with alterity as it applies to the body? (Code 2003, p. 28). Understanding is central to the hermeneutical endeavor, but it can be asked whether Gadamer develops a means of understanding which can incorporate the bodily experience of the other in all his strangeness and otherness. The example Gadamer uses of the situation of understanding concerning the body is that between physician and patient – but the example he cites of a gifted physician is the prominent Viktor von Weiszäcker. Could his model also be applicable, as Lorraine Code questions, to the relationship between a less gifted physician and a female patient with ill-defined symptoms? (Code 2003, p. 29-30) Some feminists would argue that Gadamer’s hermeneutics does not have the theoretical means to truly bring about understanding of radical alterity, because it always seeks to make that which is to be understood into something which fits into one’s own horizons. They argue that even Gadamer’s central notion of openness, that of asking questions, is one in which the presuppositions of the questions determine the way in which that which is questioned will be seen (Code 2003, p. 16). Some feminists suspect that Gadamer’s philosophy is embedded in a male, well-educated middle class environment (Code 2003, p. 15). This raises the issue to what extent his philosophy can be used to understand the truly strange or different, including the feminine body and its relationships to the world and others.
Even though Ricoeur considers the self as ontologically open to otherness, and considers the other than the self as ethically primary to the self (1992, p. 168), it can be asked to what extent he also is able to engage with alterity. For Ricoeur in his account of the self-other relationship stresses similarity. Ricoeur aims at respect for the other person, but by means of establishing similitude between self and other. The notion of similitude for Ricoeur explains the meaning of oneself as another: I can only have self-esteem if I esteem others as myself. That implies that I consider others as capable of starting something in the world as well as I am, and of acting for a reason, of creating a hierarchy of priorities, evaluating the ends of actions, and esteeming themselves on that basis (1992, p. 193). Rather than basing his ethics upon the other’s alterity, it is the other’s similitude that for Ricoeur grounds his little ethics (see Halsema 2005). From a feminist perspective, similarity is dangerous, in that it engenders forgetting, or too quickly leaving aside, differences. The questions, then, that the confrontation between a feminist such as Irigaray and Ricoeur leaves us with are, first of all, whether understanding the other as similar to the self does not lead to sidestepping the differences between self and other – such as for instance sexual difference. Secondly, we can ask whether stressing similarity or difference is the best way to bring about respect for, and recognition of, the other.
To conclude, the relevance of Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s notions of the body for feminism is limited primarily because of shortcomings in their notions of what factors play a role in understanding the body. Can they truly do justice to the materialization of bodies in language, to the power structures surrounding the understanding of the body, to a phenomenon such as sexual difference and to the existence of bodies which are significantly different?

[A] The Relevance of Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s Thought for a Feminist Notion of the Body
Do these limitations imply that Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s ideas about the body have no relevance for feminist theory? In this section we will describe in what respect their reflections can be of help for feminists in understanding the body. Because there are differences in their approaches to the body, their relevance for feminism is not entirely the same.
Gadamer’s view of the body is focused on the art of understanding the body. There are numerous concepts in Gadamer’s philosophy which speak of the importance of coming to right understanding in a dialogue situation. Examples of these are openness, questioning, respect for the other, doing justice to phenomena, the use of reason in understanding, understanding as the play of dialogue, and the fusion of horizons. Gadamer’s philosophy of understanding is sympathetic, sophisticated and is an expression of the value Bildung, having an educated perspective on matters. Gadamer describes language as listening to each other, as encompassing all reason and thought, as the universal dimension of hermeneutics. He states that the heart of philosophy is the pursuit of the logic of dialogue (Gadamer 1996, p. 166-167). From his book The Enigma of Health, it is apparent that Gadamer would like to apply his hermeneutical principles to the understanding of the body. This means that the values represented in his hermeneutics are applicable to this endeavor. 
As we have seen in the previous section, it is possible to argue that there are limitations to the notion of understanding which Gadamer develops. It is, however, not possible to doubt the fact that Gadamer strives to create a view of the dialogue between physician and patient as a situation in which they attempt to do justice to the symptoms which are at issue. Gadamer admits that the conversation may involve tension and insecurity on the part of the patient, authority on the part of the doctor and problems in understanding the enigmatic aspects of bodily sensations. But this does not mean that the ‘miracle of language’ -- true understanding -- cannot occur. Gadamer speaks of the special moments in which words are found to express what exactly one feels in one’s body, when the patient is activated to participate in the process of describing the illness. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is an ongoing process. There are no guarantees that correct understanding will always take place. In this sense misunderstanding is always a hermeneutical possibility. But Gadamer’s optimism is that we can strive to come to some type of understanding and communication about our bodies. This insight is relevant for feminism because it means that a hermeneutical model of understanding the body may in fact work. Through the dialogical values which Gadamer espouses, it may be possible to come to more understanding of the body within feminist theory.
This leaves us with another point of concern – that of the political contexts and implications of the dialogue concerning the body.  Gadamer seems to have little consideration for these factors. But it could be argued that a successful dialogue itself has political implications. Lorraine Code argues that the example of physician and patient is ‘micro political’ in the sense that there is politics in the relationship between physician and patient. There are power structures at work; there are social and political contexts for their conversation. But at the same time the example of the physician doing justice to the experience of the patient gives rise to empowerment which can initiate changes in the social order. These changes, however small, could lead to changes on a larger, macro political scale (Code 2003, p. 27-34). Even such a small, micro political moment of understanding in which the physician takes seriously a woman’s symptoms may in the end lead to larger political changes. As numerous studies have shown, heart disease in women is different from that in men. Such an insight can only come about because of the awareness of differences between women and men.
	Taking this notion of the possibility that small changes in a dialogical situation can be a means for changing larger political structures, it could be that Gadamer’s view of the hermeneutical relationship between patient and physician might function as a model for communication between people about bodily experience. Perhaps speaking and gesturing to each other about our bodies should occur within a relationship similar to the one which Gadamer describes between physician and patient – one of hermeneutical understanding in which listening and receptivity play an important role and in which the process of understanding can indeed have an influence on power structures which play a role in the perception of the body.
	As for Ricoeur, even though he does not explicitly reflect upon gender issues and the consequences of other embodied differences, his work offers several openings for feminist reflections. In the first place, the systematic way in which in Oneself as Another he works out a notion of the self that is ethical and ontologically open to otherness can enrich feminist notions of identity – in which, as noted, alterity plays an important part. Also, Ricoeur understands the subject as not only acting but also suffering. He refers not only to the willing and acting subject, but also to the one who is excluded from action and who suffers from the other’s acts. The fact that he understands human subjects as active and passive, acting and suffering, opens his work all the more to comprehending disrespect, discrimination and exclusion. Furthermore, the fact that he considers the self as embodied in a phenomenological sense means that his concept of personal and narrative identity is closer to feminist thought than theories of identity in which embodiment is not considered.
Ricoeur in his late work is concerned with questions concerning justice and recognition that are also central in feminist thought. His philosophy, even though not considering the difference between the sexes, is concerned with striving for just institutions. (Think of the self in Oneself as Another that strives for ‘the “good life” with and for others, in just institutions’ (Ricoeur 1992, p. 172)). That means that social and political change, which are the central characteristics of feminist philosophy, are considered in his philosophy as well.
	With respect to the body specifically, there are also some interesting contributions Ricoeur can make to feminist theory. First of all, his notion of the body as the locus of activity but also of passivity enriches feminist discussions on how to relate to the body, because it takes two perspectives into account. For instance, in dealing with questions concerning cosmetic surgery and other improvements or adaptations to the body, Ricoeur’s perspective helps us to understand the urge to change one’s body, to act on it as self, but also calls upon people to take their body for what it is, that is, to take it as the reality that they are, passively. The double sidedness of his perception of the body, as active and passive, can help feminist theory to contradict accounts of embodiment that only consider it as site of construction.
	Next, Ricoeur provides us with a notion of embodiment that understands humans as not only having their bodies as ‘mine’ in the phenomenological sense of the word, but also as situated in the world by means of their bodies. In its double structure the body constitutes my inextricable mineness as well as my own proper otherness that makes me appear in the world, and makes me part of it. This implies another double account of embodiment that can be enriching for feminist theorizing. For a feminist account of embodiment should include a perspective on what it implies to be situated in the world. The body is not only lived experience and a starting point for perceiving the world and others, as in Husserl’s perception of the body, but in Ricoeur’s view it is also something that receives social meanings. It is the point where normative social structures cross, structures which situate the individual socially and influence her or his self-perception.
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^1	  Feminist interest in the body shows itself for example in monographs on the body, such as Elizabeth Grosz’s Volatile Bodies (1994) and Judith Butler’s Bodies That Matter (1993), but also in the many volumes of collected essays on the body.  To name a few: Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory (Eds. Conboy et. al., 1996), Feminist Theory and the Body. A Reader (Eds. Price & Shildrick, 1999); Feminism and the Body (Schiebinger, 2000). 
^2	  See for a feminist perspective on cosmetic surgery Davis 1997. See for the association of mind-body with masculinity-femininity for instance Lloyd’s The Man of Reason (1984) and Derksen’s Dialogues on Women (1996). The feminist critique of the perception of the body in Western philosophy is described in the introductions of Grosz 1994 and Price & Shildrick 1999. One of the most important sources for the feminist critique of ignoring the body in Western philosophy is Luce Irigaray. Important works in this respect are Speculum of the Other Woman (1985), Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993), and To Be Two (2000).
^3	  Exceptions are the book edited by Lorraine Code, Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer (2003), Morny Joy’s (Ed.)., Paul Ricoeur and Narrative. Context and Contestation (1997) and the Dutch dissertation by Nel van den Haak on Ricoeur and Kristeva (2001).
^4	  The influence of Husserl and Heidegger on thinking about the body can be seen in authors varying from Merleau-Ponty to Michael Wheeler. For Wheeler’s discussion on cognition as embodied and embedded, see Wheeler 2005, p. 225-248.
^5	  The body is also mentioned in Ricoeur’s exchange with Jean-Pierre Changeux, What Makes Us Think? (2000). In this dialogue, Ricoeur refers to the phenomenological distinction between the body as object and the body as experienced, and contrasts the phenomenological notion of the body to the scientific perception of the body as object. The body concept that Ricoeur refers to in What Makes Us Think? is not analyzed here, because he does not develop other philosophical perspectives on the body than the ones referred to in his earlier works.
^6	  Ricoeur mainly mentions works from the seventies by Amelie Rorty, John Perry, Sidney Shoemaker and Bernard Williams (see note 19 in Ricoeur 1992, p. 128-129).
^7	  Ricoeur translates the German Leib and Körper into French as respectively chair and corps. In the English translation, Kathleen Blamey speaks of ‘flesh’ and ‘body’. Even though the German Leib is commonly translated into English as ‘lived body,’ we will hold on to the terminology of the English translation in Oneself as Another.
^8	  For the English translation of this passage see: Ricoeur 1992, p. 324.  
^9	  Especially in his late works Ricoeur explicitly reflects on political philosophical themes such as recognition and justice (Ricoeur 2000; Ricoeur 2005; Ricoeur 2007).
